With the press of a button at midnight in Parliament’s Central Hall, India switched to GST, the single biggest tax reform undertaken by the country in 70 years of independence.
Hello to the GST era.
The Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC) has published a lengthy FAQ published here, along with a compilation of various questions asked over their dedicated Twitter handle here.
https://www.cbec.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/gst/new-faq-on-gst-second-edition.pdf[embed]play.radiopublic.com/d89e951b-…[/embed]
Special guest and Civil Services aspirant Bhushan Shah returns to the show to talk about the Presidential race and the farmer loan waiver epidemic across the country. But first, a shoutout to everyone who witnessed the Emergency—a sorded reminder of how bad things can be without our powerful democracy.
The number of passengers carried by domestic airlines in the current calendar year registered a 17.63% growth compared to the same period in 2016¹.
4.66 crore passengers have taken domestic flights this year, compared to 3.96 crore.
Following a dip between January and February, total domestic passengers consistently grew for the remaining 4 months of the year. May saw a little over 1 crore domestic travelers, the highest this year.
Indigo currently holds the largest market share crossing 40% of total passengers up to May, followed by Jet at 17.9% and Air India at 13.3% of total passengers.
Airline traffic saw a similar trend as overall passenger traffic, dipping in February across all airlines before picking up during the remaining months of the year.
In the current year, 716 complaints have been registered across various airlines. Despite the largest volume share, Indigo has significantly fewer complaints registered (109, at a complaints/10000 ratio of 0.58) compared to Air India (245, 3.95) and the Jet group (231, 2.77).
Indigo also led in terms of on-time performance, with an OTP of 85% of flights at the four major metros (Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad and Mumbai). SpiceJet is a close second at 82.4% while Air India ranks fourth at 77.8%.
A majority of the delays among the four metro cities seem to have occurred at Mumbai Domestic Airport.
In 2016, baggage earned the largest share of complaints (28%) during the same period, Customer Service took this title in 2017 (27.8%). Refunds saw a good reduction in complaints, down to 2.7% of total complaints compared to 6.2% in 2016. Flight problems, baggage and customer service continue to be the top 3 reasons for complaints by quite a margin.
A total of 2,267 passengers have been denied boarding this year, leading to compensations worth ₹1.37cr. 19,175 passengers experienced flight cancellations (₹55 lakhs) while 91,213 suffered delays (₹89 lakhs).
¹ All data as per data provided by the Ministry of Civil Aviation
Bihar Governor Shri Ram Nath Kovind, 71, will be NDA’s Presidential Candidate for the upcoming presidential polls in July.
Kovind was formerly elected to Rajya Sabha from Uttar Pradesh where he served two terms from 1994–2006, head of BJP’s Dalit Morcha from 1998–2002, and Union Government Advocate in the Delhi High Court (1977–79), Advocate-on-record of the Supreme Court (1978) and Union Government Standing Counsel in the Supreme Court (1980–93).
Kovind was governor of Bihar starting August 2015 until he resigned June 20. West Bengal Governor Shri Keshari Nath Tripathi takes additional charge of Bihar until a full-time governor is appointed.
Telangana CM and TRS Chief KC Rao, BJD and Odisha CM Naveen Patnaik have extended their support to the candidature.
See our podcast on the President elections:
[embed][talk.ekdrishti.in/e/3548a27...](http://talk.ekdrishti.in/e/3548a272b78440/)[/embed]Some comments on Aadhaar or Adhar:
Firstly unlike a password, biometric data is not secret and also not in full control of the owner of biometrics. Biometric data today are shared not only with Aadhaar authorities but practically everywhere, including attendance systems and banks. Even on table and doors accessed by that individual.
The same problem (and more) exists with passwords. How do you stop someone from using the same one everywhere (and therefore being hacked somewhere else and then his Govt ID being abused?). From writing it down and sticking it in a drawer or on a computer screen? When it is so easy to reverse engineer, imagine tying critical services to a unique ID with a password? Even companies are moving away from just passwords (or in some cases passwords altogether). So I would argue that a password is not secret at all, and easily transferable and reverse engineered.
So then the question is, is biometrics more reliable and secure? The answer would seem to be yes.
The video has been taken down so I have no way of verifying it. But considering Google/Apple continue to use fingerprints and every notice so far of copying fingerprint is anecdotal, and that Aadhaar’s CIDR is not using just 3 points of fingerprint matching.
Financial support to non-citizens
Section 9 clarifies that Aadhaar is not the proof of Citizenship or Domicile. This means that benefits accruing out of Aadhaar will be niraadhaar (without basis of Citizenship). It is very strongly recommended that a special mark must be indicative in Aadhaar number itself (like * mark) to show that the person is NOT a citizen of India. The government has passed repeated orders to identify Indian Citizens but there appears to be no progress in this regard. In any case, the requesting entity must know if the person being enquired on is Indian or not.
I think this isn’t the right line of reasoning. Aadhaar isn’t a proof of citizenship (it is a form of identification/authentication), and therefore Aadhaar is not the basis of a subsidy either. Aadhaar is needed to avail the subsidy, not qualify for it.
For example, a certain maximum balances qualifies a JanDhan account, or a certain income level qualifies you for an LPG subsidy. UID then helps ensure that the subsidy is passed on to the qualified person correctly (and alternatively you have the guarantee the bank account was opened in your name correctly). Aadhaar doesn’t help you qualify for EPFO, it ensures you get your EPFO in your bank account, etc.
Point is, the qualification of a subsidy has not changed, and aadhar is not being used as a basis of that determination.
Financial Risk
According to section 11(2), the authority will be a body corporate, which means it will be covered under section 43(A) of the Information Technology Act and rules made thereunder. It also means that the authority will not have protection provided to the government in case of any failure. If for any reasons, any core biometric information is lost, then the authority will be liable for civil liability of unlimited amount. Unlike the other methods of authentication, biometric loss is lifelong loss, hence the liabilities of such loss will be far enhanced. In a case of complete loss, the civil liability may be few lakh crores. Is the authority or the government ready for such loss?
Will the government be morally right to pay for such loss to the citizens of India from the money collected through taxes from citizens of India, for its own incompetence? The Act is silent on this risk assessment.
Fair point. This will also need to be separated against breach (of even rules, not necessarily of data) that may occur within the ecosystem vs by the UIDAI.
Secondly, Biometrics are permanent; unlike a password or a smart card, they cannot be changed. God forbid, if the complete Aadhaar database is compromised (like that of Sony) and which must be expected to be so, the biometrics of all citizens will be compromised. Isn’t it far too big a risk for the government to take? Access to sensitive areas such as defence installations, which use biometrics as access control, will automatically become unusable for life of that senior defence officer. There is no way to correct the situation, unlike password and token.
There are numerous things that need to be done — this is what I stressed on during our Twitter chat — to ensure the system is secure. Everything from encryption methods, process certifications, splitting the DB into pieces so access to a single database does not compromise us in entirely are being done.
Numerous governments collect biometrics from their residents and also their visitors. Do we have any cases of them being leaked and then misused? There is an inherent security by purpose that requires Governments to do everything in their power to ensure the security of this database. Having reviewed within my limited expertise the access to CIDR bits, i.e., over the API, I am assured that it is not going to be easy to pull data out.
The challenges in this field will increase manifold as financial transactions based on biometrics increase. For example, the government had ordered that App Praman is used for giving life certificate for all pensioners. An individual can create his artificial fingerprint and give to his own family to continue to draw full pension even after his death.
Sure, but once the death is registered and the Aadhaar is then locked, what good is the fake fingerprint? And they wouldn’t be able to register a new person with the fake fingerprint either once the person is logged in. So it becomes a closed door.
Section 14 does not limit the citizenry of chairperson and the members of the authority, hence it is possible to appoint a chairman who is neither Indian nor resident of India. It is, therefore, necessary to make appropriate amendments in section 14 which should state that the chairperson and members should be ‘resident Indian citizens’ only. If we cannot get a reasonably competent person to be chairperson or member of the authority then it is a matter of shame. Additionally, if such persons are foreign nationals then ensuring compliance of Section 16 will be impossible.
Agree, there does not seem to be any limitation of citizenship on the authority, except indirectly and only on certain positions. I agree this should be explicit.
To your other point, you’re right as well, the Act does not quantify what violation of breach of UIDAI members would be (in case of the cool off period for instance). So a) I hope that is correct but b) it must be remembered that the law prohibits a cooling off period, meaning that a Court can then apply a reasonable punishment despite a lack of definition.
Relationship with Software, Hardware and Database Vendors
There has been repeated questioning of the UPA government in respect of the contract it has signed with various software and hardware providers and database maintainers, especially the contractual agreement between the Authority and MongoDB. Neither the UPA government nor the NDA government issued any clarification in this regard.
The issue I have the constant mention of MongoDB is that there is no mention of this anywhere. To some extent, the level of agreement and other specific details of the infrastructure should be limited (and clearly is). What has been made clear is that multiple technologies are in use (for example 3 open source softwares are in use for deduplication) with a focus on open source to eliminate proprietary restrictions or lack of support.
If the silence is considered as acceptance of this contractual flaw, then section 22B has extended this contractual liability forever and shared the private sensitive data of Indian citizens and residents with the US government. The charges are serious and silence is not an answer.
I don’t believe silence makes something accepted or contractual. Do we have a right to know — thereby giving someone with malintentions the right to know — this we can debate. While I have heard the MongoDB arguments multiple times, I’m yet to see anything verified that use of MongoDB automatically hands anything to the US Government, but the problem with something ambigious is both sides can keep fighting without something verifiable. That said, if Aadhaar is disconnected from the open world (as it is listed to be), connectible only via verified vendors and through specified APIs, this would still severely limit any one’s access to data.
But the point you make here starts with an assumption, and if that assumption is wrong, then the rest does not flow. There has been no indication that technical safeguards are not in place — things like separating storage of different pieces of data across independent DBs, encryption models — which are in fact in place.
Section 23(2)(c)empowers the Authority to appoint an entity for operation of Central Identity Database Repository (CIDR). However, no limitation has been put in this regard that Indians’ core sensitive data will not be handed over to a foreign entity. There is a precedence of such misuse, which has serious national security impact.
Actually the law is quite clear re: core sensitive data, coming from Section 29 (1)(a), that it cannot be shared ‘with anyone for any reason whatsoever,’ other than for ‘national security’, which in turn, has to be verified by an Oversight Committee, followed by a Court order.
Attempt to Risk Transfer
The risk in case of leakage of personal sensitive data of ALL Indian citizens is enormously high and irreparable. Once biometrics are lost they are lost forever, no change is possible. Through Section 28 (4)(c ), the Act has made a weak attempt to transfer such risks to the consultants and advisers which is neither practical nor possible to meet the civil liabilities in case of loss of any core biometric information. In case the decision to implement any advice is that of the Authority then the liability also must rest with the Authority. Only limited liability up to the fee so paid can be charged from Advisers and consultants. No court will support such open-ended provision.
With over 400 crore auth transactions and no clear stealing of data having been done, this is an assumption. Yes the risk is high and hence the safeguards are also high.
Where does the Act limit liability of violation? In fact, due to Section 29 (1), sharing core biometric data is a serious violation of law, even if punishment has not been specified.
Second, Section 28(4)(c ) actually imposes requirement on the UIDAI to ensure that agreements are entered into are correct and compliant with the Act. The Act says that core biometric data cannot be shared with anyone. Therefore any agreement that allows this sharing is a continued violation of this law, as well as any provisions under IPC/IT Act. See the immediate next Section 28(5) that no one in the Authority can reveal information inside the CIDR to “anyone”.
Intelligence Gathering
The Bill at Section 13(3) allows the intelligence agencies to dip into the core biometric information and even extract it for an individual or group
No idea what this is. There is no section 13(3) and no, no intelligence agency has any provision within the Act to “dip into the core biometric information”.
In fact, in 2014, the CBI wanted Aadhaar biometric details of an individual, which the High Court ordered. The UIDAI filed a response in the Supreme Court, to which the Supreme Court ordered, and I quote:
“In the meanwhile, the present petitioner is restrained from transferring any biometric information of any person who has been allotted the Aadhaar number to any other agency without his consent in writing.”
The UIDAI’s request was upheld and the Court ruled that even transfer of information to investigative agencies had to be done with ‘consent’ of the holder.
Additionally, the Act is silent on security and privacy of the databases collected by Intelligence Agencies over a period of time, interacting with CIDR. And with this single mechanism, Gestapo or Nazi type operations can be easily launched. Unlike many advanced countries, India does not have an Intelligence Services Act to fix accountability. Hence this can lead to serious breach to freedom of citizens. (I have personally suffered such abuse by Intelligence Agencies).
I feel you are referencing the Bill 2010 perhaps. The 2016 Act is *not* silent on security or privacy of interacting with the CIDR, and the Regulations further define this. While i’m sorry you have sufferenced abuse by Intelligence Agencies, this does not flow from the law.
To clarify, I understand you’re targeting the implications of breach. But the question is always in the process — is the law solid, and then if so, is it being implimented/adjudicated correctly. So my argument is that the law actually entails enough provisions to help protect everywhere and illegitimize items like you mention in terms of interacting with CIDR.
Target of Cyber warfare
Central Identity Data Repository (CIDR) will be a valid and lucrative target for cyber war. Operation PRISM, Vault 7 and many other leakages of information of NSA (USA) have clearly established that the agenda of United States is to have cyber supremacy over the world.
[…] It may be noted that the RSA designed algorithm has inbuilt security loophole for the US Government to hack into any system / individual using it. Therefore unless such algorithm, including its random seed generator are written, vetted and certified in India, it will be serious cyber war-related security threat.
India has the capacity to write such codes and vet + Certify them, but it is not clear if the source code of these algorithms have been written in India and vetted by a different Indian authority or not. In case these are provisioned directly from where the software and database have been procured, then it must be assumed that CIDR stands already compromised, and US government already has Aadhaar CIDR data.
Again we’re starting with an assumption, which if incorrect crumbles the entire argument. What is however clear from various technical documents published by the UIDAI, the CIDR does not run on a single piece of software and therefore even if we were to concede that a piece of software came direct and the US government has some way to break that (remember that just hackable software isn’t enough, you need to be able to reach the servers running *that* piece of software to do something with it, but fine), even then it does not automatically flow that the US Government has Aadhaar data.
RSA is not the *only* encryption algorithm in play. In the layer where it is involved, it is combined with ECB. The other encryption layer uses AES/SHA-256. I have already highlighted how well each of these algorithms are rated, and cite a report by the European Network of Excellent in Cryptology. I will make the assumption here that they would not be going around recommending encryption that is loopholed by the US Govt.
Minimum Punishment with Complex Procedures
Chapter VII of the Act shows that the Government is NOT serious to punish anyone in case of any breach. On one hand, the Act agrees that it is collecting personal sensitive data of all residents of India, but on the other hand, there is no offence mentioned which has punishment more than three years of imprisonment.
The argument is subjective, but as we debated on Twitter, offences can be compounded with IPC or the IT Act, which carry their own terms of imprisonment.
Just logically, the Act has made establishes what is legal. A Court’s interpretation therefore would be that failure to correctly collect data or misuse of data would be, by definition illegal. In the event that the Law does not specify punishment, the Court can fill the gaps. With respect to the offences listed there — such as the case where an agency revealed someone’s Aadhaar number even if inadvertantly — the UIDAI is the fine that has to file the case. The expectation then is that the citizen’s right to grievance redressal (guaranteed under Law as well), will then be furthered by the UIDAI in the event of violation. However, I contend that should the UIDAI fail in guaranteeing the person’s right to grievance redressal, you have a right to ask the Court to intervene, by virtual of it being illegal under the Act itself.
The world is well aware of the case of Edward Snowden stealing this type of information from the National Security Agency of USA. In case of similar act by any employee of the authority, the maximum punishment is just ONE year imprisonment with fine of Rs. 25,000/-.
Edward Snowden stole biometric data? Or confidential documents?
Does the Government intend that if an employee of CIDR who has authorised access takes unauthorised copies from CIDR, he is not a serious offender? On similar lines, if the chairperson and/or members compromise anything related to Aadhaar, no action can be taken against them unless the same authority complaints against itself [refer section 47(1)]. Even Government has no power to make complaint for any such criminal liability.
The law does not guarantee this authorized access, and legally it is clear that it makes him a serious offender, albeit without a specific sentence.
The Government has cut its own hands; it cannot even issue directions related to technical or administrative matters (submitting complaint for an offence is an administrative action and not a policy issue) as the Aadhaar authority becomes ultimate authority in such matters under proviso of Section 50(1).
Thus we have a situation where ONLY on the ‘complaint’ of the Aadhaar Authority a criminal proceeding can be initiated; Police investigation is NOT necessary; such offences despite being of low punishment value can be tried ONLY in CMM or Session Court; but no court can give punishment more than three years of imprisonment.
If the Central government would have given itself superceeding powers, wouldn’t the argument have been that ultimately you want an independent entity managing this and not misuse by political pressure? This is the reason for these provisions and in fact, makes sense. But also note Section 50(2): “The decision of the Central Government, whether a question is one of policy or not, shall be final.” We can’t have a discussing about wanting foreign Govts out of the security loopholes that may exist but also want the Central Govt to have powers to use technical shortcomings right? You want the politicos out of the administrative matters — pertaining to maintaining, running operations, etc as well.
The problem again is that of isolation, one rule does not negate the other. Firstly, the police wouldn’t be involved anyway. Second, it must be remembered that everything pertaining to the CIDR and its definition comes from the IT Act (the CIDR is a protected system under Section 70 making it punishable with a 10 year term) and a CII under NCIIPC making even the attempt to break into it an Act of cyber terrorism.
I want to finally comment on this line:
It appears that the present Government has picked up the pathetically drafted Aadhaar Bill prepared by UPA Government, dusted, rehashed it at a few places[…]
How? The sheer number of differences between the two bills is monumental (see this), not to mention that the Bill did not even have a definition for core biometric data, let alone its protection. This, in and of itself, cannot be considered “rehashed in a few places”, sorry.
The fundamental issue—compounded in India due to our sheer numbers—is how do we ensure service delivery without identification. Aadhaar attempts to solve this bottom line. Without the Act though, Aadhaar was horrendously problematic and I believe the Act takes care of numerous issues that would have severely hindered both adoption and utilization. Unlike other government IDs like a passport, it will be harder to fake—you can still create a fake number for example, but when a services require you to authenticate, each auth will be verified making it that much harder to game the system, which is why I like it better.
Some of the issues you raise such as where things say ‘will be explained by Regulation’ actually are explained in Regulation (there are 5 Regulations simultaneously introduced that specify other elements). My problem arise at assumptions that something is just flawed, or worse, We’d be fools to think there isn’t scope for improvement in the law so I say let’s continue to suggest those.
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Special guest Girish Alva joins me on the show to talk about the new Rules under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, the slaughter of a calf in Kerala in protest and the #GiveUpAMeal campaign.
Links:
Numerous pieces have been surfacing over the last few days discussing the impacts of the Government’s new Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Rules, notified on May 23.
Harish Damodaran, writing for the Indian Express:
In short, it restricts the scope of “animal markets” only to trading of cattle “bought for agricultural purposes and not for slaughter”.
I’d rephrase this. The scope of “animal markets” covers trading of all animals, with the restriction that cattle trading within the markets should be for agricultural purposes only.
The underlying objective, it seems, is to segregate milch/agricultural purpose bovines from those intended for slaughter.
I’d argue that the underlying objective is the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Yes, it also does specify that cattle within the animal markets is limited to agricultural purposes only but making the objective of the entire set of rules on one provision paints a lopsided picture.
This piece also glosses over numerous items that are now prohibited in entirety under Section 14, including: hot/cold branding, nose/ear cutting, drenching fluids forcibly or using steroids for purposes other than veterinary treatment, castration, tying nose bags and the like, for all animals. Do these not constitute cruelty to animals?
And even further, we aren’t even discussing environment impacts of slaughter, and particularly unregulated slaughter houses.
We cannot discuss laws without putting them in the right context, and we cannot rule out the cruelty metted to animals while discussing the Act and its Rules.
Referencing the article above, Swarajya Mag adds:
If traceability and hygiene were the drivers of these rules, why have goats been exempted from this; surely those consuming mutton also have the right to get hygienic meat?
The hygiene, storing, moving and other restrictions on ensuring proper treatment to animals in the animal markets apply to all animals. In fact, the only restriction specific to cattle is regarding sale within in the animal market as mentioned above. The rest of the provisions apply to all animals, there’s no ambiguity here. I have no idea where this conclusion came from.
Further:
The Modi government has a huge employment crisis staring at it in the face; having a few million more people unemployed is only going to hurt it more.
Sure there will be short term impacts to employment with the new Rules, but should the decision to pass a law focused on preventing cruelty to animals be based on employment? That’s like saying ‘child trafficking shouldn’t be illegal, sure a few children suffer, but think about everyone that’s employed in the child trafficking business’! Is that how these decisions should be discussed, let alone made?
What these new rules are certainly going to do is increase inspector raj and petty corruption, given the enormous paperwork involved. Illegal trade will flourish. And that will only lead to a step up in the activities of cow vigilantes, who will target even legal transactions. The new rules may have noble intentions behind them, but they may end up doing more harm than good.
Since we’re speculating now, here’s my postulation: cow vigilantism will only increase if people willing to take the law into their hands feel that the Government is not doing enough via legislation to safeguard cows and start taking matters into their own hands, no?
It would be a grave injustice to discuss the new Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Rules without discussing cruelty to animals. There’s a reason people are going from non-vegetarianism to veganism, even without a direct/religious reason to not eat meat: inhumane treatement of animals in production and slaughter facilities. Veganism has estimatedly grown 3.5x in the UK over the last 10 years. Similar estimates say half of vegetarins in the US are vegan, numbering 16 million.
To only focus on issues with jobs, or new paperwork within the rules and gloss over the prohibition of cruel practices, as well as ensuring decent living and trading conditions within animal markets seems morally wrong to me.
The Election Commission of India (ECI) has announced an open challenge to political parties to demonstrate if the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) can be tampered on 3 June 2017. The challenge is issued to parties who contested in any of the Punjab, Goa, Manipur, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh elections concluded in March 2017.
More about how EVMs work and the election procedure with respect to EVMs can be found in our previous post.
The salient features of the challenge are:
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Special guest and aspiring civil servant Bhushan Shah joins me to talk about labour reforms for the textile industry and we also catch up on the mobile phone tower portal, the newly created employment data task force, health initiatives and Mumbai infrastructure. I also mispronounce meningitis.
Show links & notes:
Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Environment, Forest and Climate Change passed away today.
The Centre has decided that the National Flag will fly half-mast in Delhi and all State/UT capitals today and on the day of the funeral.
All NGOs have been given a final opportunity to file their annual returns within 30 days, ending 14 June 2017. No compounding fee will be imposed within this deadline.
Numerous NGOs are under scrutiny for not filing returns from FY2010–11 to FY2014–15. NGOs that do not file returns will not be granted renewal of registration.
https://fcraonline.nic.in/home/PDF_Doc/fc_Notice_12052017_01.pdfSanjay Duttai, reporting for The Times of India
[Energy Efficiency Services Ltd.] now plans to replicate this programme in the U.K and considering a subsidiary to push business. Goyal said it should start with large Indian-owned enterprise.
[…]
EESL targets to replace 1 million inefficient lamps with LED bulbs in the U.K. initially, covering 10 million households.
The economies of scale coupled with the export earnings would mean good things for energy efficiency industry. India currently accounts for 10–12% of the global LED bulb market.
The 2,230 kg South Asia satellite (GSAT-9) was successfully launched using India’s Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-F09). The launch was accomplished from the Second Launch Pad at Satish Dhawan Space Centre SHAR at Sriharikota.
The GSLV-F09 used 4 liquid propellant strap-on motors, each carrying 42 tons of fuel. The Satellite hit Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) in 17 minutes after liftoff at 16:57 GST. The Master Control Facility (MCF) at Hassan, Karnataka has assumed control of the Satellite.
The GSAT is currently orbiting the Earth with a perigee (closest point) of 169km and orbital inclination w.r.t the equator of 20.65 degrees. It will be raised to the final circular Geostationary Orbit (GSO) in a few days before being commissioned into service.
The GSAT-9 has 12 Ku band transponders and took three years to fabricate with a total cost of Rs. 230 crore. Its two solar arrays will generate 3.5 kilowatts of power.
It will be used facilitate DTH television, VSAT links, tele-education, tele-medicine and disaster management support, and is shared by India and 7 South Asian nations.
The Supreme Court on Friday upheld the death sentence awarded to four convicts in the 2012 Delhi gangrape case by a Delhi fast-track court in 2013 and subsequently the Delhi High Court in 2014, rejecting the appeal filed by the convicts.
That we have to cheer that at 4 years and 4 months, this was a ‘fast track’ trial resolution is not a great testament of our due process.
Some things to remember:
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Special guest and aspiring civil servant Bhushan Shah joins me to talk about India’s three-year action agenda and the National Civil Aviation Policy.
Links:
The NITI Aayog — which replaced the Planning Commission in 2014 — is currently finalizing the three year action agenda, first released on 23 April 2017. The Agenda spans 2017–18 to 2019–20 and includes action items for the states in addition to the Centre.
In addition to the Action Agenda, the NITI Aayog is also preparing a 15-year Vision and 7-year Strategy plans which will cover the period 2017–18 through to 2031–32. This makes the 12th five-year plan (2012–17) the last Five Year Plan.
The 3-year Action Agenda was being prepared based on inputs from Central, State and UT Governments. Additionally, consultations have been held with subject matter experts in education, health, culture, transport as well as scientists, economists, journalists and industry associations.
Some of the key agenda items in the Agenda are:
You can read the full draft action agenda here:
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Special guest and aspiring civil servant Bhushan Shah joins me to talk about 30 days of the new Uttar Pradesh Government and a look at the increasing foreign investment being picked up by state governments recently.
Links:
Bhadra Sinha, reporting for Hindustan Times:
For the first time in the Supreme Court’s history, three constitution benches of five judges each will sit during the summer break. These would be in addition to the two regular vacation benches set up every year to hear urgent matters.
Music to my ears.
The historic Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime today came a step closer to meet its July 1 target of rollout, with the Lok Sabha approving four supplementary legislations.
The Central GST Bill, 2017; The Integrated GST Bill, 2017; The GST (Compensation to States) Bill, 2017; and The Union Territory GST Bill, 2017 were passed after negation of a host of amendments moved by the Opposition parties.
Someday I’ll look back and remember how I watched the live stream of much of the debate and the vote, much like the passing of the 122nd Constitutional Amendment that made GST a reality.
Finance Minster Arun Jaitley’s speech in Lok Sabha addressing various questions raised and before he moved the bills is available here.
Mary Achkhanian, reporting for Gulf News:
Indian passport holders with a valid American visa or a Green Card will now be eligible to obtain a UAE visa on arrival, as per the decree approved by the UAE Cabinet, it was announced on Wednesday.
The visa will be valid for 14 days, with a single extension possible for a fee.
Lovely news that follows the UAE Crown Prince H. H. Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan being chief guest at India’s Republic Day 2017 celebrations.
The time taken for trade mark examination has been reduced to less than one month, down from 13 months. As of February 2017, 28,889 applications are pending for examination, while 7.92 lakh applications are pending at all stages, due to lack of manpower according to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry
Earlier this month, the new Trade Mark Rules 2017 were introduced. Trade mark applications now require 8 forms (down from 74), and a 50% incentive for startups. The entire process can now be completed via e-filing and video conference support is available.
https://airtable.com/shrcxDzUV745X5FyLMoushumi Das Gupta and Neelam Pandey, reporting for Hindustan Times:
The 12-digit Aadhaar number has helped states strike off 4.4 lakh “ghost students” from schools across Jharkhand, Manipur and Andhra Pradesh, for whom the government had been earmarking funds under the mid-day meal scheme.
This is no small number. Those raising a large hue and cry over the Government’s decision to introduce Aadhaar verification of students availing the benefit need to understand the numbers, and the leak at stake.
For instance, Andhra Pradesh — which linked all its 29 lakh government school students to Aadhaar — had 2.1 lakh claimants who existed only on paper.
It might look small at 7.2% but remember that’s 2,10,000 fake students. And this is just one state.
In Jharkhand, the names of 2.2 lakh non-existent students have been deleted from school records. So far, 89% of the 48 lakh students enrolled in the state’s government schools have availed of Aadhaar numbers.
4.4 lakh fake students in just 3 states implies a large leak within the mid-day meal scheme, especially since the way the process works is that a state government receives a contribution from the Centre (Northeastern states receive 90% from the Centre, all other states get 40%) against the number of students receiving the subsidy. In 2015–16, 10.3 crore students availed the subsidy. Even at 7%, the number of ghost students could be 72,00,000!
The cost incurred by the Central Government is Rs. 4.13 per child per day for primary and Rs. 6.18 per child per day for upper primary. Even at the Rs. 4.13 cost level, we’re looking at estimated leakages amount to Rs. 1000 crores across the Country, and this does not include spending by the states.
Clearly there is a large leak within the mid-day meal scheme, add to already immense Rs. 49,000 crore estimated to be saved by controlling leakages in LPG subsidy, MNREGA, scholarship and pension schemes.
This doesn’t even begin on the teacher’s problem:
A pilot study conducted by Kerala’s department of general education in 2014, after Aadhaar numbers were integrated with the student database, found its schools to have an excess of 3,892 teachers.
In terms of total numbers:
At present, only 30% of the 11 crore students enrolled in class one to eight at government schools across India possess Aadhaar cards.
Remember that the Government has clarified that it will not deny benefits for lack of Aadhaar, but will continue to encourage larger enrollment to help weed out the problem.
M Kalam, writing for the Tech Observer:
After launch of its India manufacturing operations in October last year, global hardware networking giant Cisco has finally delivered the first made in India router under ‘Make in India’ initiative. As gesture the Cisco handed over the first Made in India Router valued under $1500 to the Union electronics & IT minister Ravi Shankar Prasad.
Good to see B2B businesses, especially one with Cisco’s might, begin manufacturing in India. This will result in a quieter but substantial change for locally manufactured products.
Harish Damodaran, writing for The Indian Express:
When urea is applied to the soil, it is first hydrolysed or broken by water into ammonium ions (NH4+), followed by oxidation to nitrite (NO2-) and, then, nitrate (NO3-) forms. This nitrification process is what makes the nitrogen, which is 46 per cent in urea, available to the crops.
[…]
Neem oil basically acts as a ‘nitrification inhibitor’ when coated on urea. By slowing down urea hydrolysis and nitrification, it allows a more gradual release of nitrogen, which can be used by the plant. “Neem-coating increases nitrogen use efficiency. Also, since the urea action is prolonged, the plants stay greener for a longer time. Farmers apply urea when they notice the leaves turning yellowish. But if the crop here is retaining greenness for an extended period, they would reduce the frequency of application. Instead of three bags for an acre of paddy or wheat, they might be using only two now”, Prasad points out.
Some science behind the ‘magic’ behind neem-coated urea, which might explain the contradiction that although food grain output is rising YoY, fertilizer sales are in fact, down, including that of urea. Good read.
Daniel Twining, writing for Foreign Policy:
Americans suffering a crisis of confidence about the future of their country’s democratic institutions under President Donald Trump could use a dose of Indian-style optimism.
[…]
India’s experience offers a useful antidote to Western pessimism — and a reminder that democracy can offer solutions to the growth and governance dilemmas that afflict the United States and Europe.
Twining takes a view on the ‘feeling’ side of the political debate, crediting Modi with ‘doing something’ with his strong political mandate which, in the context of the thumping victory in Uttar Pradesh, seems to be creating an undercurrent of optimism in India. He highlights FDI reform, overall growth cross 7% per year, the upcoming Goods & Services Tax, bankruptcy bill, demonetisation, Jan-Dhan Accounts and Direct Benefit Transfer, and the Modi Government’s foreign policy.
He also makes an interesting point regarding India’s constant election situation:
At the same time, aspirational Indian voters increasingly manifest a tendency to reward governments that deliver growth and toss out politicians who do not meet performance tests. Strong anti-incumbency instincts keep politicians on their toes.
I think that the cost and constant election cycle are more detrimental than good, but perhaps the corollary to India constantly analysing everything from an election perspective is that politicians also have to be ‘on their toes’.
It’s an interesting take overall, correctly grasping the optimism among Indians since 2014, against the overall pessimism in the US since their last election.