Chirag Desai

The Central Information Commission (CIC) looks after second appeals and complaints received by the commission with respect to the Right to Information Act, 2005.

According to the RTI Act, 2005, Section 20 (1), a fine of Rs. 250 per day up to a maximum of Rs. 25,000 pay be imposed on an Information Officer for refusing an application, not furnishing a reply within stipulated timeframes, malafidely denies the request or furnishes incorrect information.

During the FY15–16, Rs. 10,52,500 penalty was imposed, as against Rs. 7,39,000 during the previous FY. 19,25,000 was fined during FY13–14.

^1 The Right to Information Act, 2005

Dhananjay Mahapatral, reporting for The Times of India:

…the Supreme Court collegium has finalised the memorandum of procedure (MoP) for appointment of judges to constitutional courts.

Finally.

The appointment of Supreme Court judges was a heavily debated topic under previous Chief Justice T. S. Thakur, starting with the Centre’s suggestion for a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), which was struck down by the Supreme Court in October 2015.

In December 2015, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the Central Government could amend the Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of judges, in consultation with the CJI. The Bench also broadly suggested that amendments towards eligibility of judges, transparency in appointments and establishment of a secretariat to review appointment-related complaints be looked into.

A bone of contention related to the ‘national security’ clause that the Centre insisted on adding to the eligibility of judges for appointment, and the Secretariat. Progress has been swift since Chief Justice J. S. Khehar took over in January, and the new Collegium has now approved both items.

Further:

Finalisation of the MoP, which will be sent to the Centre for approval and adoption this week, raises hopes of speedy filling up of vacancies in HCs, which are operating at below 60% of their sanctioned strength.

Clearance of pending cases is a huge problem in India. Just last week, the Supreme Court also set out timelines for case hearing, ordering lower courts to dispense of cases more than five years’ old by the end of the year.

EVMs have been used in all elections in India since 2000, and began their use in Lok Sabha elections in 2004. Quite naturally, there are a few advantages to the EVMs over the traditional ballot paper usage in India. EVMs are cost-efficient, less prone to booth capture and rigging while also severely reduce polling and counting times. In fact, a Madras High Court judgement from 2005 estimates cost of printing and counting using ballots to be 30–40% of total election expenses.

The machines

An EVM comprises two units — a Ballot Unit and a Control Unit. The program used in EVMs is burnt into a one-time programmable chip so that it cannot be altered with thereafter. The machines are not networked in any way to ensure prevention of external interference. EVMs are powered by a 6V battery, and therefore do not rely on an external power source.

In 2006, newer EVMs were introduced with features such as dynamic coding between Ballot Unit and Control Unit, real-time clock, full display, and data and time stamp of each key press.

The EC has now received approval to introduce an upgrade to the EVM, dubbed the ‘M3’ which will replace all pre-2006 EVMs last used during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. This would mean that older machines without the date-time stamp and other features introduced in 2006 will no longer be in use. The newer machines also have a digital verification system to oversee the contact between two component units, making it further tamper proof by turning the machine inoperative upon fault or change in components. 5.5 lakh M3 EVMs have already been ordered, costing Rs. 3000 crore.

During the 2017 Assembly elections, as part of a United Nations Development Program initiative, 5 countries were given briefings on the Indian electoral process, including the use of EVMs and Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).

Manufacture

Two indigenous companies currently build the EVMs: Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), a PSU under Ministry of Defense, and Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL), a PSU under the Ministry of Atomic Energy.

The EC has requested approval for a third — Central Electronics Ltd. — to be added to help with production of newer M3 units, this approval is still pending.

The EC notes that various levels of testing is performed at these sites before any machines are put into production, including independent units that perform Quality Assurance of the machines. Further, manufacturers do not have information about candidates several years into the future, or what constituency or the sequence of candidates in the Ballot Unit.

Procedure

Before every election, the EC begins a series of checks¹:

• A first level check (FLC) is done in the presence of political parties’ representatives. Manufacturers certify all components are original within the operational EVMs (malfunctioning EVMs are not used in the election).
• The plastic cabinet of the Control Unit are then sealed, and signed by the parties’ representatives. Access to any internal components does not occur thereafter.
• The parties representatives then randomly select 5% of the EVMs, on which a minimum of 1,000 votes are cast. Results of this ‘mock poll’ and all votes are printed and shared with the representatives, and the poll is videographed.
• EVMs are randomized once for allocation of machines to constituencies, and a second time to the individual polling stations in the presence of candidates or their representatives. Final list of EVM serial numbers allocated to a polling station are provided to the parties or their candidates.
• Candidates and their representatives are allowed to conduct additional mock polls at candidate setting.
• They can also conduct a mock poll before the actual poll on poll day.
• Once the candidate setting is complete, the Ballot Unit of the EVM is also sealed, preventing access to the inside of the Ballot Unit. This is also signed by the candidate/representatives.
• On polling day, a mock poll with a minimum of 50 votes is conducted at each polling station in the presence of representatives.
• An additional thread seal and paper seal are now put on the EVMs to block access to all buttons except those needed for the poll. Candidates/representatives are allowed to sign off on this as well.
• At the end of polling, the presiding officer presses the ‘close’ button on the EVM in the presence of polling agents. No votes can be polled thereafter.
• Now the EVM is sealed entirely, and candidates/representatives are allowed to sign off are they are satisfied.
• Strong rooms where EVMs are sealed between polling and counting. Candidates/representatives are allowed to place their own seals, and have their own watchers. The EC posts its own watchers 24x7.

Historically speaking…

Before and after EVMs were introduced, numerous committees were constituted to review their use. To start of, a technical expert committee was appointed by the GoI in 1990, headed by Prof. S. Sampath, with Prof. P. V. Indiresan, and Dr. C. Rao Kasarbada as members. In November 2010, this Committee was expanded to add two additional experts in Prof. D. K. Sharma and Prof. Rajat Moona (now Director General, C-DAC).

The courts were involved as well. The Madras High Court started by rejecting tampering allegations all the way back in 2001, followed by the Kerala High Court in 2002. In 2004, the Karnataka High Court Judge K S Rai said:

After thorough practical experimentation and research the present version of EVM is designed. This invention is undoubtedly a great achievement in the electronic and computer technology and a national pride.

A Mumbai High Court judgement was also issued in 2005.

In 2010, Hari K. Prasad² along with Alex Halderman and Rop Gonggrijp, published a study wherein they claimed to have proved that Indian EVMs were hackable.

Their paper implies that it is not a ‘hack’ of the original system using a vulnerability in software, they physically replaced one of the components with a look-alike. This look-alike was then remotely instructed to modify votes. Their second option also involved breaking into the machine between polling and counting since there is often a delay between these two events. In either case, some kind of physical access to the device was needed to perform any tampering, meaning their claims were based on procedural issues in delivering and storing EVMs, and physically replacing components. These issues are addressed by the detailed process described above, and further improved by newer digitally-encoded EVMs.

Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court, on petition by Subramanian Swamy overturning the High Court of Delhi, ruled that the EC needed to add Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) system to EVMs as a requirement for free and fair elections, and to add to voter confidence.

20,000 VVPATs were purchased in 2013, and 33,500 came through in 2016. The assembly elections in Goa had all 40 constituencies with VVPAT.

In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, VVPAT was available in 8 constituencies. The announcement of the new M3 machines by the EC is congruent with the Supreme Court verdict towards replacing all old EVMs prior to the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

¹ Based on the process as described by the Election Commission of India.

² Hari Prasad was reportedly arrested sometime in 2010. While there is not much additional information, it is believed the reason for his arrest was not his research findings, but the fact that he had obtained an EVM and refused to reveal his source, as it did not come from the EC.

Updated (9 Apr 2017) to include additional details regarding new M3 EVMs

…and a little bit about Shakti Peeth

Shakti Peeth, or seat of Shakti, comprise a series of holy destinations originated when Goddess Sati’s body disintegrated into pieces and fell all over the subcontinent when Lord Shiv carried her corpse in sorrow on her death. 51 peeths are recognized around India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Pakistan.

Out of this, 12 are considered main Shakti Peeth Tirth, namely:

• Bhagwati Mahakali Maha Shakti, Ujjan
• Mata Kamakshi at Kanchi Puram
• Bramaramba, Malaygiri
• Kumarika, Kanya Kumari
• Ambaji, Gujarat
• Mahalaxmi, Kohlapur
• Devi Lalita at Prayag
• Vindhyavasini, Vindhya
• Vishalakshi, Varanasi
• Mangalavati, Gaya
• Sundari Bhavani, Bengal
• Guhyakesari, Nepal

Ambājī (અંબાજી, अम्बाजी) is located 185 km from Ahmedabad in Gujarat, and 45 kms from Mount Abu in Rajasthan. It is believed that the Heart of Sati Devi fell here, according to Tantra Chudamani.

Gabbar

The location where Devi Sati’s heart fell is Gabbar parvath. Gabbar also assumes significance in two main time periods in our history — during Ramayan, where Lord Ram and Laxman were told to worship Devi Ambaji at Gabbar, where he was given ‘Ajay’ arrow; and the mundan ceremony of child Lord Krishna in presence of his foster parents Nand and Yashoda.

A small temple has been built on Gabbar for darshan. For those who cannot climb to visit Gabbar parvath, a Cable car service is available with a lovely scenic view of one side of the mountain.

The temple, and the Shakti Yantra

The Shikhar of the temple is 61 ft high, at the top of which is a Dhwaj (holy long flag) and Mataji’s Trishul.

There is no idol or picture in the main temple. A convex-shaped Holy Shakti Vishwa Yantra, inscribed with figures and 51 Bijapatra (letters) and the ‘Shree’ syllable is installed such that it is visible for devotion, and cannot be photographed. Non-priests are no longer allowed in the core area around the Yantra.

The priests decorate the Shakti Yantra such that one can imagine it as an idol of Ma Amba in one of her incarnations, shown on her vahan. Depending on the day of the week, Devi ma is shown to be on a different vahan between a peacock, lion, elephant, etc. I will hopefully post the exact set the next time I’m able to visit.

About two years ago, a ‘museum’ of sorts has been setup in the temple, where the team shares a bit about the history of the temple and its importance. A replica of the yantra is also available, and it is truly amazing how different the yantra actually is, compared to what you experience in the temple itself.

Ambaji temple is one of the only places in the world where I experience true peace of mind. As a family, we do try to visit the temple at least once a year.

Over the last few years, the temple trust has been using gold donations to the template to encash the shrine in gold. Over 30 kg of gold has been donated so far, to help with the project to to cover the Shikhar, of which 41 ft have been completed.

The internals of the shrine have also been gold encased as of my last visit.

You can donate to the temple through SBI (Gujarat > Religious Institute > Shree Arasuri Ambajimata Devasthan Trust) here.

The temple also has a Havan Shala, with one main Havan Kund and 8 smaller Havan Kund.

Festivals

Bhadarva Poonam is one of the most popular festivals for visitors to the temple. An estimated 18 — 20 lakh pedesterian pilgrims visit during the festival. Have witnessed them walking along the path to the temple for days and various pop-up rest stops that serve tea, food and rest to the pilgrims are set up by devotees. The euphoria of devotees is a sight and feeling to behold, as I was fortunate enough to a couple of years ago. Devotees arrive with their dhwaj’s and are allowed to climb to the side of the Shikhar to hoist it.

51 Shaktipeeth replica

Lookalike temples of all 51 Shakti Peeth have been created right by Gabbar hills. The project took 6 years to finish and was opened for visit in 2014, allowing devotees to experience all 51 Shakti Peeths in one place.

Timings

Ambaji temple timings are as follows:

• Morning Aarti: 6–6:30 a.m.
• Darshan: 6:30–10:45 a.m.
• Rajbhog: 12–12:15 p.m.
• Atrakuth Aarti: 12:15–12:30 p.m.
• Afternoon Darshan: 12:30–4:15 p.m.
• Evening Aarti: 6:30–7 p.m.
• Evening Darshan: 7–9 p.m.

Soumya Chatterjee, writing for The News Minute:

Karthik’s website, “Return to India Kit” is a straightforward, no-frills guide, that offers returning Indians advice on everything from how and why to get an Aadhaar card to changing postal addresses from the US to India to settling loose ends with the IRS (the US tax agency) to getting OCI cards for American-born children to finding jobs in India. Along the way, it also has resources on setting up start-ups in India, transferring wealth back to India and so on.

I’ve interacted with Mani a few times on Twitter and once in person during his past Middle-east life. This is a smart, and a lovely initiative. Credible knowledge transfer is something that deserves encouragement.

Anubhuti Vishnoi, reporting for the Economic Times:

The latest avatar of the Electronic Voting Machine is called ‘M3’ and the Election Commission is looking to ramp up its production ahead of the 2019 Lok Sabha polls.

EVMs were first used in 1998 so any improvement is welcome.

On technology improvements in the M3:

The M3 comes with digital verification system coded into each machine which is necessary to establish contact between its two component units. This makes it absolutely tamper proof.

Numerous reports of EVM hacks have surfaced over the years, even leading the Supreme Court to order the Voter Verifier Paper Trail (VVPT) system in 2013.

5.5 lakh new M3 EVMs have been ordered already at a cost of Rs. 3,000 crore, to replace an estimated 9 lakh M1 machines. Approval is awaited on adding a third PSU to ramp up manufacturing:

Central Electronics Ltd in Ghaziabad could soon join Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and Electronics Corporation of India, sources in the EC confirmed.

The Economic Times:

Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court- appointed SIT on black money, Justice Arijit Pasayat, today said Rs 70,000 crore of black money has been unearthed so far and the sixth report on it will be submitted to the apex court in April.

Rupa Subramanya, writing for ORF Online:

The data for PoS show that December 2016 saw a whopping 84 percent increase in PoS as compared to the trend and January 2017 saw a big 72 percent increase above trend. Again, while it’s true there’s a drop in absolute level, such two data point analysis misses the fact that PoS is still way above the pre-demonetisation trend.

This is part of Rupa’s ongoing research into digitisation of the Indian economy overall, including as an effect of demonetization.

As I have also said before, we are still months away from the ‘final’ picture. The general expectation, and the data seems aligned with this, is the net usage pattern, once the dust well and truly settles will be a larger digitisation of the Indian economy by more than just a few percentage points.

Bank transactions such as NEFT, IMPS are seeing double digit percentage increases, the only question to be raised is how much of this is force, and how much of it preference.

She also raises causes for concern:

…admittedly anecdotal evidence suggests that after an initial adoption of digital payments methods, some smaller merchants and traders are now reverting to cash, since the liquidity crunch has largely eased. By the same token, some consumers are now reverting to cash, which is back in ATMs.

Rupa is right in suggesting that this isn’t about trying to return to a ‘black’ economy per se, but issues like “high frequency of failed transactions, network issues and high transaction costs” are certainly making cash feel more convenient. There will also be a more general pushback out of desire to return to old habits now that the ‘inconvenience’ of being forced to use digital payments is over.

BHIM is making good strides to counter this problem (17 million downloads and transactions volumes going up), but digitisation will be well and truly home once banks decide to make it easier to do so. The latest series of bank transacation charges will only put off consumers.

Until then, cash will always feel and be the ‘cheaper’ option.

Hi all, I wanted to introduce Drishti talk, our podcast covering informative discourse around topics that matter to the Indian electorate.

To this end, I invite you to please follow our publication here with a Medium account or on Twitter if you prefer. Tell us your topics of interest, or topics you have expertise on and would like a platform to share.

We think there are enough political debates — particularly shouting matches — out there, and our focus is on informing the Indian voter by puttings facts and direction in context and trying to understand real outcomes.

The general format will be free-flowing conversation (30–45 minutes long) that is both constructive and positive around the India story and hopefully sensitive topics that are lacking informative discussion.

You can listen to our podcast using:

• Apple Podcasts
• Overcast
• Pocket cast
• Follow our publication or the Drishti talk page
• our RSS feed link on your favourite podcast player

I look forward to your feedback, and thoughts on our podcasts as well as the topics we discuss. Together, we can take many steps forward. It is time.

Suranjana Roy, reporting for LiveMint:

The UIDAI filed a police complaint on 15 February against Axis Bank Ltd, business correspondent Suvidhaa Infoserve and e-sign provider eMudhra, alleging they had attempted unauthorized authentication and impersonation by illegally storing Aadhaar biometrics.

In terms of details:

The breach was noticed after one individual performed 397 biometric transactions between 14 July 2016 and 19 February 2017. Of these, 194 transactions were performed through Axis Bank, 112 through eMudhra and 91 through Suvidhaa Infoserve.

In a statement issued by the UIDAI, they said:

With reference to an incident of misuse of biometrics reported in a newspaper, UIDAI said that it is an isolated case of an employee working with a bank’s Business Correspondent’s company making an attempt to misuse his own biometrics which was detected by UIDAI internal security system and subsequently actions under the Aadhaar Act have been initiated.

It looks like an employee working within the Aadhaar framework played with the data (the UIDAI says it was his own data), and that it was UIDAI that flagged the issue and filed a criminal case against the parties involved. In technical terms, the Aadhaar database was not hacked or breached, but human access of the platform was misused. Moreover, it is the important to note that it is the UIDAI’s own systems that eventually picked up on this misuse.

But it does raise some of the larger points the opponents of Aadhaar keep highlighting — trusting any entity with data, particularly biometric data, is unsafe by definition. There is though, the point wherein a unique identity system in a country like India where benefits, subsidies and other services are rampant and untraceable, having a unique, two-step verifiable method to verify citizens’ access to schemes, and rooting out corruption has already brought about numerous benefits.

I’d love to have a more detailed debate on Aadhaar, one covering the Act, the change in its provisions in March 2016, and the larger point of making where to take Aadhaar in India — including how it is administered/delivered, privacy regulations, and more. Please comment if this is something you’d be interested in doing, and we’ll see how we can give this discussion some shape.

One final tidbit:

There has been no incident of misuse of Aadhaar biometrics leading to identity theft and financial loss during the last five years when more than 400 crore Aadhaar authentication transactions have taken place, according to Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).

Notwithstanding the population of India, that is still a lot of transactions.